The U-shaped Investment Curve: Theory and Evidence by Sean Cleary et al.







University of Rochester and CEPR
November 2003
¤Sean Cleary, Frank H. Sobey Faculty of Commerce, Saint Mary’s University, Halifax, Nova Sco-
tia, Canada B3H 3C3, sean.cleary@stmarys.ca; Paul Povel, Curtis L. Carlson School of Manage-
ment, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455, povel@umn.edu; Michael Raith, William E.
Simon Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627,
raith@simon.rochester.edu. Part of this paper is based on Povel and Raith (2002). We would like to
thank Rui Albuquerque, Michael Barclay, Philip Joos, Evgeny Lyandres, Huntley Schaller, Bill Schwert,
Clara Vega, Toni Whited, and Lu Zhang for very useful comments and suggestions. We also thank the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) for ﬁnancial support.The U-shaped Investment Curve:
Theory and Evidence
Abstract
This paper examines how the investment of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms varies with their
level of internal funds. We develop a theoretical model of optimal investment under
ﬁnancial constraints. Our model endogenizes the costs of external funds and allows for
negative levels of internal funds. We show that the resulting relationship between internal
funds and investment is U-shaped. In particular, when a ﬁrm’s internal funds are negative
and suﬃciently low, a further decrease leads to an increase in investment. This eﬀect is
driven by the investor’s participation constraint: when part of any loan must be used to
close a ﬁnancing gap, the investor will provide funds only if the ﬁrm invests at a scale
large enough to generate the revenue that enables the ﬁrm to repay. We test our theory
using a data set with close to 100,000 ﬁrm-year observations. The data strongly support
our predictions. Among other results, we ﬁnd a negative relationship between measures
of internal funds and investment for a substantial share of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms.
Our results also help to explain some contrasting ﬁndings in the empirical investment
literature.
Keywords: Financial constraints, capital market imperfections, ﬁnancial contracts, in-
vestment, internal funds, investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity
JEL-Codes: G32, G33, L131 Introduction
It is a long-standing idea in ﬁnancial economics that when ﬁrms face capital market
imperfections, they are forced to pay a premium for externally raised over internally
generated funds. A number of theoretical models predict that the investment of ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrms, i.e. ﬁrms that need to rely on external funds, varies positively with their
internal funds, whereas the investment of unconstrained ﬁrms does not. This prediction
appears to be supported by a large empirical literature, see Hubbard (1998). On the other
hand, there has also been considerable recent controversy about the validity of empirical
ﬁndings results as well as of their theoretical underpinnings.1
In this paper we challenge the notion that the investment of a ﬁnancially constrained
ﬁrm is always positively related to its internal funds. We develop a model of optimal
investment that is based on fairly standard assumptions, except that we determine the
cost of borrowing funds endogenously, and that we allow a ﬁrm’s internal funds to be
negative. We show that the resulting relationship between the ﬁrm’s internal funds and
its investment is not monotonic, but U-shaped. More precisely, when a ﬁrm has positive
internal funds, its investment is increasing in its internal funds, as other theories also
predict. In contrast, if the level of internal funds is suﬃciently negative, investment is
decreasing in the level of internal funds.
Using an unusually comprehensive data set with close to 100,000 ﬁrm-year observa-
tions, we ﬁnd considerable empirical support for our theory. A variety of tests suggest
that investment is indeed a U-shaped function of diﬀerent measures of internal funds. In
particular, the relationship is negative for the ﬁrms with the lowest levels of internal funds.
These ﬁrms are not just a small minority of “distressed” ﬁrms; instead, they comprise
about a quarter of all observations. We conclude that previous predictions and evidence
about the consequences of ﬁnancial constraints are valid only if attention is conﬁned to
relatively ﬁnancially healthy ﬁrms.
We also show that capital market imperfections and a lack of own funds are two
dimensions of ﬁnancial constraints that have quite diﬀerent implications for investment
1 See Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000), Fazzari et al. (2000), and the references in Footnote 4.
1behavior. In particular, we show that the contrasting ﬁndings of Fazzari et al. (1988) and
Kaplan and Zingales (1997), which are based on diﬀerent empirical approaches, are easy
to explain by our predictions.2
We develop a simple model of a ﬁrm with a given level of internal funds that may
require additional funds to ﬁnance an investment. The revenue resulting from the invest-
ment is stochastic and unobservable to the ﬁrm’s outside investor. As shown by Diamond
(1984) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), a debt contract is optimal in this setting. De-
faulting on a promised repayment may be followed by liquidation of the ﬁrm; and since
liquidation is ineﬃcient, external funds are more costly than internal funds.
We make three key assumptions, two of which amount to relaxing assumptions com-
mon in other models. First, the ﬁrm’s internal funds can be negative; i.e. the ﬁrm may
face a ﬁnancing gap (e.g. due to ﬁxed costs, past losses, or ﬁnancial obligations) that
must be closed before it can invest. This possibility has been ignored in earlier contribu-
tions (for references see the discussion in Section 3.3), but as we show, it is relevant both
theoretically and empirically.
Second, we endogenize the cost of external funds by explicitly considering the investor’s
participation constraint. This approach is common in many models;3 it turns out to be
central to the relationship between internal funds and optimal investment.
Third, we assume that the ﬁrm’s investment is scalable, and thereby relax a common
assumption in the literature that a ﬁrm can only choose whether or not to invest in a
given project (see Section 3.3). With scalable investment, the ﬁrm’s optimal level depends
on the marginal cost of external funds, whereas focusing on the average cost of external
funds (e.g. an interest rate) can lead to misleading conclusions.
Two eﬀects are at work when a ﬁrm decides how much to invest using external funds.
First, if the ﬁrm increases its investment, it must borrow more, which increases its required
repayment and therefore the risk of liquidation. We call the resulting increase in the
2 Recent alternative explanations include Boyle and Guthrie (2003), Dasgupta and Sengupta (2003),
and Moyen (2003). We discuss these papers in Section 4.4.
3 See the discussion in Section 3.3; an exception is Kaplan and Zingales (1997), who assume that the
costs of external funds are given by an exogenous function.
2marginal cost of debt ﬁnance the cost eﬀect. Second, and less obviously, if the ﬁrm
increases its investment, the resulting increase in expected revenue improves the ﬁrm’s
ability to repay its debt and reduces the marginal cost of debt ﬁnance. We call this the
revenue eﬀect.
With positive internal funds, the cost eﬀect dominates, and our model yields the
traditional result that the ﬁrm’s investment is increasing in its internal funds. With
suﬃciently negative internal funds, however, the revenue eﬀect eventually dominates. At
this point, if the ﬁrm’s internal funds decrease even more, the ﬁrm increases its investment,
and overall we obtain a U-shaped investment curve. Intuitively, the more likely default
becomes, the more likely the investor will receive the ﬁrm’s realized revenue as repayment.
Since the ﬁrm’s investment is below the ﬁrst-best level, at some point the investor accepts
a lower marginal interest rate, which induces the ﬁrm to increase investment.
Our prediction of a U-shape follows from the three key assumptions discussed above.
In contrast, other models often assume that internal funds are nonnegative, or that the
investment is ﬁxed. One then obtains a positive relationship between internal funds and
investment because the revenue eﬀect is either dominated by the cost eﬀect (as in the ﬁrst
case) or does not exist (as in the second). The investor’s participation constraint also plays
an essential role for the U-shape; in contrast, in Kaplan and Zingales (1997) the costs of
borrowing are exogenous. In our model, if the ﬁrm’s internal funds are negative, the
investor will agree to provide funds only if the investment is large enough to generate the
revenue necessary to repay him; and the larger the ﬁnancing gap, the larger the required
investment. This argument does not depend on the details of the ﬁnancial contract used,
and is therefore more general than our model.
We extend our model to study how investment depends on the asymmetry of informa-
tion between ﬁrm and investor. We ﬁnd that investment as a function of internal funds
retains its U-shape. With positive or not too negative internal funds, more asymmetric
information leads to a higher marginal cost of debt ﬁnance and therefore a reduction in
investment; investment also responds more strongly to changes in internal funds. With
suﬃciently negative internal funds, on the other hand, investment increases, and the
3relationship between internal funds and investment becomes more negative.
While our model is stylized, the interdependencies it captures apply to all ﬁrms’ ﬁ-
nancing and investment decisions. The key insight is that investors care about how their
funds will be invested, and that the anticipated use of external funds determines the ﬁrms’
cost of raising them. While ﬁrms rarely roll over all of their debt at one point of time,
as we assume in our model, the key lesson should remain valid: ﬁrms with large ﬁnancial
gaps ﬁnd it easier to ﬁnance large rather than small investments.
We test our theory using a large data set (an unbalanced panel containing 93,923
ﬁrm-year observations). We use two diﬀerent proxies for internal funds, namely cash ﬂow
and working capital. In our data, 22% of the observations have a negative cash ﬂow, and
37% have negative working capital.
We conduct four kinds of tests: ﬁrst, we compute mean and median investment levels
for ventiles (i.e., 20-quantiles) of cash ﬂow or working capital. In both cases, we obtain a U-
shaped relationship between internal funds and investment. That is, investment is lowest
for levels of cash ﬂow or working capital near zero, and increases with either measure. On
the other hand, ﬁrms with cash ﬂow or working capital in the negative range invest more
as their internal funds decrease. The decreasing range of the investment curve covers
approximately a quarter of all observations.
Our second test is to regress investment on cash ﬂow and the market-to-book ratio (a
proxy for Tobin’s q), and to augment this by adding a squared cash ﬂow term. Consistent
with the U-shape predicted by our model, we ﬁnd that both cash ﬂow coeﬃcients are
positive, and that including a square term noticeably improves the explanatory power of
the regression.
As an alternative way to detect nonlinearities in the data, we conduct spline regressions
of investment on cash ﬂow or working capital. That is, we estimate investment as a
piecewise linear, continuous function of cash ﬂow or working capital by splitting the
data into diﬀerent quantiles. In all regressions, predicted investment is U-shaped in the
proxy for internal funds; in particular, the coeﬃcients for the groups with the lowest
internal funds are always negative and signiﬁcant. For very high levels of cash ﬂow or
4working capital, the coeﬃcients decrease again, probably due to the presence of ﬁnancially
unconstrained ﬁrms, which are not expected to respond to changes in cash ﬂow.
Finally, as is standard in the investment literature, we run split-sample regressions.
Speciﬁcally, we regress investment on cash ﬂow and the market-to-book ratio separately
for observations with positive or negative internal funds. Consistent with our predictions
and our other empirical results, we obtain a positive coeﬃcient for the positive group, but
a negative coeﬃcient for the negative group.4
Our results help to understand previous empirical ﬁndings and shed light on a recent
controversy over conﬂicting results. We argue that both sample selection and the criteria
used to classify ﬁrms play a more important role than has previously been recognized.
First, many other studies eliminate ﬁrms for which observations are missing for some
years, often to eliminate “distressed” ﬁrms from the data. “Balancing” the data in this
way, however, introduces a strong bias towards ﬁnancially healthy ﬁrms and eliminates
most observations with negative cash ﬂow. The use of balanced data (as well as the lack
of a theory to rely on) may explain why negative cash-ﬂow coeﬃcients have not previously
been reported.
On the other hand, our model implies that eliminating ﬁnancially weaker ﬁrms is
actually necessary to obtain a positive relationship between ﬁnancial constraints and
investment-cash ﬂow sensitivities. That is, greater informational asymmetry between
a ﬁrm and its investor will lead to a higher investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity where the
relationship is positive. Without the latter restriction, however, no clear prediction is
possible. Consistent with our theory, and conﬁrming the results of Fazzari et al. (1988),
we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with a low payout ratio have a higher cash-ﬂow sensitivity than ﬁrms
with a high payout ratio if we use sub-samples that exclude ﬁnancially less healthy ﬁrms.
4 The approach of regressing investment on cash ﬂow and proxies for Tobin’s q has been criticized in
Erickson and Whited (2000) and Gomes (2001), who argue that measurement error concerning Tobin’s
q may bias the coeﬃcients in investment equations (see also Alti (2003)). Our theory itself is immune
to this line of criticism, since in our model the ﬁrm’s investment opportunities are held ﬁxed. In our
empirical analysis, a test (suggested by Erickson and Whited, 2001) shows that measurement error is not
a major concern.
5We ﬁnd no such evidence when we use the whole sample.
Second, our distinction between internal funds and asymmetric information as two
dimensions of ﬁnancial constraints sheds light on a recent controversy over the usefulness
of measuring investment-cash ﬂow coeﬃcients to document the eﬀects of ﬁnancial con-
straints. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue that the empirical approach devised by Fazzari
et al. (1988) is not well grounded in theory; they and Cleary (1999) provide evidence in
apparent conﬂict to Fazzari et al. (1988). Fazzari et al. (2000) argue that the results of
Kaplan and Zingales are in part attributable to their method of identifying ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrms. That is, Fazzari et al. (1988) and many others classify ﬁrms according
to proxies of the capital market imperfections they face (see also Hubbard (1998)). In
contrast, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999) use indices based on ﬁnancial
strength according to traditional ﬁnancial ratios, which tend to be strongly correlated
with a ﬁrm’s internal funds.
Contradicting the interpretations of both Kaplan and Zingales (2000) and Fazzari et
al. (2000), our theory explains why the diﬀerent criteria used to classify ﬁrms should
be expected to lead to the diﬀerent ﬁndings reported in the literature. When ﬁrms are
classiﬁed according to the capital market imperfections they face (captured in our model
by informational asymmetry), and when the ﬁnancially weakest ﬁrms are excluded, we
predict a higher investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity for the more constrained ﬁrms. On
the other hand, when ﬁrms are classiﬁed by their internal funds, then the U-shaped
investment curve leads to the prediction that among the ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, the
more constrained ones will have a lower investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity.
We present evidence for both predictions, supporting the ﬁndings of both Fazzari et
al. (1988) and Cleary (1999) using one data set. As described above, ﬁrms with lower
payout ratios tend to have a higher investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity, provided that we
eliminate ﬁnancially less healthy ﬁrms from the data, as Fazzari et al. (1988) also did.
On the other hand, when using a measure similar to the Z-score in Cleary (1999), we ﬁnd
that more constrained ﬁrms have a lower investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model. Section
63 contains our theoretical analysis, in which we derive the ﬁrm’s optimal investment as a
function of its internal funds, and relate our results to other theories. In Section 4, we test
our predictions, relate our ﬁndings to previous empirical work, and discuss some recent
alternative theoretical explanations. Section 5 concludes. Some of the proofs appear in
the Appendix.
2 The Model
A risk-neutral ﬁrm can invest an amount I ¸ 0. This investment generates a stochastic
revenue of F(I;µ) one period later, where µ is a random variable distributed with density
!(µ) and c.d.f. Ω(µ) over some interval [µ; ¯ µ]. We assume that
² The partial derivatives Fµ and FIµ are both positive; that is, higher values of µ
correspond to strictly higher revenue and higher marginal revenue on I. Given
these assumptions, it is natural to think of µ as the uncertain state of demand for
the ﬁrm’s products.
² F is concave, and E[F(I;µ)] ¡ I has a unique maximum at some positive I, which
we denote by ¯ I (E[¢] denotes the expected value over µ).
² F(0;µ) = 0; that is, revenue is zero if the ﬁrm does not invest.
² F(I;µ) = 0. This assumption ensures that if the ﬁrm raises outside funds, it will
default on any promised repayment with positive probability.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The ﬁrm has internal funds W available, where W may be positive or negative. If
W < ¯ I, we call the ﬁrm ﬁnancially constrained. It can oﬀer a ﬁnancial contract to
a risk-neutral investor, stipulating that the ﬁrm obtains an amount I ¡W to invest
I. The investor can accept or reject the contract.
2. The ﬁrm earns a revenue of F(I;µ), which is unobservable to the investor.
73. The ﬁrm makes a payment R to the investor. The contract speciﬁes whether the
ﬁrm is to be liquidated or to be allowed to continue, depending on its payment. We
allow the liquidation decision to be stochastic; i.e. the contract speciﬁes a probability
of liquidation as a function of the ﬁrm’s payment.5
4. If the ﬁrm is allowed to continue, it earns an additional nontransferable payoﬀ ¼2.
If it is terminated, the ﬁrm’s assets are sold for a liquidation value of L < ¼2, which
is veriﬁable.
Our setup is similar to the models of Diamond (1984) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990).
Through creative accounting or other means, the ﬁrm can hide a part of its revenue from
the investor. For simplicity, we assume that the ﬁrm’s entire revenue is unobservable,
while the investment itself is contractible (our results would be the same with unobservable
investment, cf. Povel and Raith (2003)).
The ﬁrm’s assets have a market value of L, which, depending on the provisions of
the contract, the investor may claim if the ﬁrm fails to repay. However, the assets are
worth ¼2 to the current owner. The diﬀerence ¼2 ¡ L can be interpreted either as a
private beneﬁt that an owner-manager receives from running his ﬁrm, or as a future
proﬁt that is not contractible. The liquidation value L plays no central role in our model,
however. As we will show, it is the risk of losing the entire ¼2 that motivates the ﬁrm
to repay the investor; therefore, external ﬁnancing is feasible even if it is not secured by
any marketable collateral. While a higher L reduces the cost of obtaining funds from the
investor, qualitatively none of our results depends on whether L is large, small, or zero,
as long as L < ¼2 (otherwise the agency problem disappears). Also, while we assume here
that ¼2 is ﬁxed, Povel and Raith (2003) show that our results would not be aﬀected if we
allowed it to vary positively with the ﬁrm’s investment.
Finally, we assume that investment does not involve any ﬁxed costs; we also abstract
from the possibility of issuing risk-free claims to ﬁnance investment. Both can easily be
5 Alternatively, we could assume that the ﬁrm’s assets are divisible, and that the contract can stipulate
partial liquidation of those assets. This is formally equivalent to stochastic liquidation of all assets if the
ﬁrm’s future proﬁt is proportional to the fraction of assets it retains.
8subsumed in W, the amount the ﬁrm has available for variable investment costs: ﬁxed
costs lead to a higher, and risk-free debt capacity to a lower value of W. We also assume
that when seeking funds, the ﬁrm has no debt that is due later when the ﬁrm receives
revenue from its investment.6 This assumption allows us to study underinvestment that
is not caused by debt overhang.
3 Financial Constraints and Optimal Investment
In this section, we analyze the model described above. We ﬁrst derive the optimal debt
contract (Section 3.1) and then characterize how investment depends on the availability
of internal funds (Section 3.2). We discuss in Section 3.3 which assumptions matter for
our main result, and which don’t. In an extension, we look at how investment is aﬀected
by asymmetric information (Section 3.4).
3.1 The Optimal Debt Contract
Our informational assumptions are very similar to those in Diamond (1984) and Bolton
and Scharfstein (1990); we therefore omit the details of how the optimal ﬁnancial contract
is derived. Since the ﬁrm’s revenue is unobservable, a threat of liquidation is needed to
induce the ﬁrm to repay the investor. The optimal contract is a debt contract:







F(¯ I;µ) ¡ ¯ I:
¸
(1)
If the ﬁrm wants to invest I and needs external funds to do so, it will oﬀer the following
contract: it borrows I ¡ W from the investor and promises to repay an amount D. If
the ﬁrm repays D, it is allowed to continue; if it repays R < D (i.e. defaults), it is
allowed to continue with probability ¯(R) = 1 ¡ D¡R
¼2 , and it is liquidated with probability
6 We do, however, allow for debt that is due immediately before the ﬁrm can invest; it enters negatively
into W.
91¡¯(R). The required repayment D and the threshold state between default and solvency
b µ are implicitly deﬁned by
D = F(I; b µ) (2)









!(µ)dµ + (1 ¡ Ω(b µ))D = I ¡ W: (3)
The repayment D cannot exceed ¼2, which may place an upper bound on I.
The optimal contract induces the ﬁrm to repay either the “face value” D or otherwise
its entire revenue. A threat to liquidate ensures that the ﬁrm pays what it promised if
it has the necessary cash. Since liquidation is ineﬃcient (it yields L < ¼2), the optimal
contract minimizes the likelihood of executing this threat, which leads to a probabilistic
liquidation rule. Under the additional assumptions of footnote 5, one would obtain an
equivalent contract with non-stochastic, partial liquidation. Povel and Raith (2003) gen-
eralize Proposition 1 to the case of unobservable investment. The lower bound W in (1)
is obtained by solving (3) for I = ¯ I and b µ = ¯ µ, using (2).
3.2 Internal Funds and Investment Choice
The ﬁrm’s desired investment I determines the amount I ¡ W that the ﬁrm needs to
borrow, and through (2) and (3) the required repayment D and the bankruptcy threshold






[F(I;µ) ¡ D + ¼2]!(µ)dµ: (4)
subject to the investor’s participation constraint (3). Substituting the continuation prob-
ability according to Proposition 1 for ¯(¢), (4) and (3) can be rewritten as
E[F(I;µ)] ¡ D(I;W) + ¼2: (5)
where D(I;W) solves (3). The optimal investment is therefore given by the ﬁrst-order
condition
E[FI(I;µ)] = DI(I;W): (6)
10Without ﬁnancial constraints, the right-hand side would be equal to one. An examination
of how changes in W aﬀect (6) leads to our main result that investment is a U-shaped
function of internal funds:
Proposition 2 At W = ¯ I and at W = W, the ﬁrm invests the ﬁrst-best level ¯ I. On the
interval (W; ¯ I), the optimal investment function I(W) is strictly lower than ¯ I and has a
unique minimum at a negative level of internal funds f W.
Proof: see Appendix.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The solid curve in Figure 1 shows investment as a function of the ﬁrm’s internal funds
(the dotted curve is explained in Section 3.3).7 Notice that the ﬁrm invests less if it is
ﬁnancially constrained than if it is not. This is not a consequence of debt overhang, which
we ruled out by assumption. It is not a consequence of credit rationing either: it is easy
to show that if ﬁnancing is feasible at all, the ﬁrm can also ﬁnance the ﬁrst-best level ¯ I.
Rather, underinvestment occurs because the risk of liquidation is a necessary element of
the debt contract. Since the investor must break even on average, the ﬁrm internalizes the
expected costs of liquidation when it chooses its investment. Trading oﬀ current earnings
against the risk of liquidation, the ﬁrm invests below the ﬁrst-best level ¯ I because a lower
investment requires a lower repayment, which increases its probability of survival.
To understand why the investment function I(W) is U-shaped, observe from (6) that
the ﬁrm’s investment varies with W only because of changes in DI(I;W), which is given










!(µ)dµ + [1 ¡ Ω(b µ)]DI(I;W) = 1: (7)
Notice that W does not explicitly appear in (7). However, for any given I a decrease in
W requires higher debt D for the investor to break even (cf. (3)), which leads to a higher
probability of default, i.e. a higher value of b µ. Changes in b µ, in turn, aﬀect the marginal
7 Figure 1 depicts the function for a simple example with F(I;µ) = µ
p
I and µ » U[0;4]. This yields
f W = ¡9= 16. If W = f W, the probability of default is 1= 2 and the probability of liquidation is no more than
1= 8 if ¼2 ¸ 3. See Povel and Raith (2002, Appendix B), for more details.
11cost of debt ﬁnance via (7). The key to the non-monotonicity of I(W) is that DI(I;W)
is determined by the interaction of two eﬀects, a cost eﬀect and a revenue eﬀect.
The cost eﬀect is the more obvious one: when the ﬁrm increases its investment, it
needs a larger loan and hence must repay a higher debt. The higher the debt, however,
the more likely the ﬁrm is to default, i.e. the higher b µ. The higher b µ, in turn, the larger
is the increase in the marginal cost DI(I;W) required for the investor to break even, cf.
the last term in (7).
The revenue eﬀect reduces the cost of borrowing: when the ﬁrm increases its invest-
ment, the distribution of revenue is stretched to the right. This beneﬁts the investor
because he receives the ﬁrm’s revenue if the ﬁrm defaults. Other things equal, the result-
ing increase in the investor’s expected repayment allows him to lower the marginal cost
DI(I;W) required for a given increase in investment.
The U-shape of I(W) reﬂects the shift in the relative magnitude of the cost and the
revenue eﬀects as the ﬁrm’s internal funds W change. If W decreases, the ﬁrm requires
a larger loan to maintain its level of investment. A larger loan also means a higher debt
and hence a higher probability of default. The more likely default becomes, however, the
more the investor stands to gain from increases in the ﬁrm’s investment, i.e. the greater
the revenue eﬀect. For higher levels of W, where the ﬁrm’s debt and probability of default
are small, the cost eﬀect dominates the revenue eﬀect. As a consequence, decreases in
W lead to a higher marginal cost of debt ﬁnance, inducing the ﬁrm to invest less. As W
decreases further, the importance of the revenue eﬀect gradually increases. The marginal
cost DI(I;W) increases more slowly, and the ﬁrm reduces I further, but at a smaller rate.
When W decreases further, however, the revenue eﬀect must eventually dominate the
cost eﬀect. Intuitively, the more likely default becomes, the more likely the investor will
receive the ﬁrm’s realized revenue as repayment. Since the ﬁrm’s investment is below the
ﬁrst-best level, at some point an increase in investment, matched by an increase in debt
that leaves b µ unchanged, would actually increase the investor’s payoﬀ. At this point, the
investor accepts a lower DI(I;W), inducing the ﬁrm to increase I. As the probability of
default approaches 1 and the ﬁrm thus reaches its debt capacity, the investor is certain
12to receive all the ﬁrm’s revenue, DI(I;W) converges back to 1, and the ﬁrm’s investment
reaches its ﬁrst-best level again. Over the range W 2 [W; ¯ I], the function I(W) is not
necessarily convex throughout, but it is quasi-convex, i.e. U-shaped.8
To better understand Proposition 2, it is helpful to distinguish between the marginal
cost of debt ﬁnance, DI(I;W), and the average cost of debt ﬁnance, measured for example
by the risk premium
i(I;W) =
D(I;W) ¡ (I ¡ W)
I ¡ W
: (8)
The eﬀects of ﬁnancial constraints on investment are often described in terms of their
eﬀect of the risk premium. In contrast, we have emphasized that the ﬁrm’s investment
depends on its marginal cost DI(I;W), which we showed to be a non-monotonic function
of W. Thinking in terms of the risk premium instead is misleading because the marginal
and average costs of debt ﬁnance behave very diﬀerently. In fact, the risk premium i
always increases if W falls:
Proposition 3 If W decreases and either I or the capital requirement I¡W is held ﬁxed,
then the risk premium increases.
Proof: See Appendix.
3.3 Robustness and Critical Assumptions
A number of other theories predict a monotonic, positive relationship between internal
funds and investment. In light of the obvious contrast with the U-shape predicted in
Proposition 2, we need to discuss which assumptions in our model drive our result, and
which ones do not. In brief, our result follows from relaxing two restrictive assumptions
often made in other models. Equally important is that we derive the costs of borrowing
endogenously. The particular form of debt contract we use, on the other hand, is not
critical to our result.
8 The intuition for why f W (the minimum of I(W)) is negative is more diﬃcult to convey and not
central to our empirical predictions; see Povel and Raith (2002) for a more detailed discussion.
13First, several models assume that the ﬁrm’s investment is not scalable but instead
ﬁxed.9 In this case, there cannot be a revenue eﬀect; and investment is increasing in
internal funds (i.e. it may or may not be undertaken) because of the cost eﬀect. Second,
if internal funds are assumed to be non-negative, a revenue eﬀect exists but is always
dominated by the cost eﬀect, which again leads to a monotonic relationship. For example,
Bernanke et al. (1999) and DeMarzo and Fishman (2000) allow for scalable investment,
but do not consider negative levels of internal funds.10 They ﬁnd that investment is
increasing in internal funds. Gale and Hellwig (1985) also consider scalable investments;
they argue that investment cannot be monotonic in internal funds for suﬃciently low
levels of internal funds, but do not explore the issue.11
Third, we determine the cost of borrowing endogenously via the investor’s participation
constraint.12 In contrast, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) model the cost of outside funds as
an exogenous function that is increasing in the amount raised and in a shift parameter.
What is missing in their speciﬁcation is that investment also has a revenue eﬀect.13 When
the revenue eﬀect is taken into account, investment may still be locally convex or concave
in internal funds, as in Kaplan and Zingales (1997). Overall, however, investment is a
9 See e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990); Calomiris and Hubbard (1990); Bolton and Scharfstein
(1990); or Hart and Moore (1998). Models with scalable investment are Gale and Hellwig (1985); Kaplan
and Zingales (1997); Bernanke et al. (1999); or DeMarzo and Fishman (2000).
10 Other models with this assumption include Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990); Calomiris and
Hubbard (1990); Bolton and Scharfstein (1990); Hart and Moore (1998); or Kaplan and Zingales (1997).
11 A more detailed discussion is contained in Gale and Hellwig (1986).
12 Other models with this assumption include Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990); Calomiris and
Hubbard (1990); Bolton and Scharfstein (1990); Hart and Moore (1998); Kaplan and Zingales (1997);
Bernanke et al. (1999); or DeMarzo and Fishman (2000).
13 Speciﬁcally, Kaplan and Zingales assume that I and W aﬀect the cost of outside funds only jointly,
through their diﬀerence I ¡ W (the amount borrowed). In our model, the cost of outside funds is
determined by the investor’s participation constraint (3), where I enters as part of the cost I ¡ W but
also enters on the revenue side. Thus, Kaplan and Zingales’ model fails to capture the revenue eﬀect,
and the use of an exogenous cost function leads to more ambiguous predictions about investment than
our model.
14quasi-convex function of internal funds.
Notice, however, that the speciﬁc form of the ﬁnancial contract derived above is not
essential for the U-shaped investment curve. Irrespective of how external funds are raised,
i.e. no matter what ﬁnancial contract is used, an investor will provide funds to a ﬁrm with
strongly negative internal funds only if the ﬁrm will invest on a large enough scale, since
only then it can generate suﬃcient revenue to repay the investor. The lower (i.e. more
negative) W, the larger is the ﬁrm’s minimally required investment, implying that the
relationship between internal funds and investment must eventually turn from positive to
negative.
In our model, the smallest investment Imin(W) for which ﬁnancing is feasible is the
I that solves (3) under the assumption that the ﬁrm’s debt D is as high as possible, i.e.









F(Imin;µ) = Imin ¡ W: (9)
The solution to (9) for Imin(W) is shown in Figure 1 as a dotted curve. Financing is
feasible for any I 2 [Imin(W); ¯ I], and the ﬁrm chooses its optimal level of investment
from this set. Diﬀerentiating (9) with respect to W shows that the minimal investment
Imin(W) increases as W decreases, and reaches ¯ I at W = W.
3.4 Asymmetric Information and Investment Choice
In this section we extend the model to introduce uncertainty about the ﬁrm’s future
payoﬀ, which allows us to vary the informational asymmetry between ﬁrm and investor.
Suppose that the ﬁrm’s expected future payoﬀ and liquidation value continue to be ¼2 and
L, but that their realized values are stochastic. Speciﬁcally, suppose that they are both
zero with probability ®, and ¼2
1¡® and L
1¡® with probability 1 ¡ ®. The ﬁrm learns its
future payoﬀ when its revenue is realized; if it learns that its future payoﬀ is zero, it has
no incentive to pay any money to the investor.
This extension of the model captures the idea that two otherwise identical ﬁrms may
face diﬀerently severe problems of asymmetric information. Our original model corre-
sponds to the case ® = 0; for larger values of ®, there is more asymmetric information
15between ﬁrm and investor (as before, asymmetric information arises only after the ﬁrm
has made its investment).
It is straightforward to show that the contract characterized in Proposition 1 remains
optimal: if the future payoﬀ is zero, no payment can be enforced; whereas if the future
payoﬀ is large, the ﬁrm and the investor are back in the original setup. The investor’s










!(µ)dµ + (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ Ω(b µ))D ¡ I + W = 0 (10)
(cf. (3)), and the ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize
E[F(I;µ)] ¡ (1 ¡ ®)D + ¼2 (11)
subject to (10).
Clearly, for W ¸ ¯ I the ﬁrm’s investment remains at ¯ I. For lower levels of W, borrowing
is more expensive than if ® = 0: since revenue is more risky, a higher repayment D(I;W)
has to be promised. As before, the cost and revenue eﬀects determine the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing
and investment choices; investment a function of the level of internal funds remains U-
shaped and continuous at W = ¯ I. The left end of the U-curve (where b µ = µ) lies to the
right of the original W.
Changes in ® have a diﬀerent eﬀect on investment than changes in W. For levels of
internal funds higher than the new W we can show:
Proposition 4 For inﬁnitesimal increases in ®,
(a) If IW ¸ 0, then I® < 0; that is, whenever investment is increasing in internal funds,
it is decreasing in the degree of informational asymmetry.
(b) For W suﬃciently close to ¯ I, we have IW® > 0; i.e. the sensitivity of investment
with respect to the level of internal funds is increasing in ®.
(c) The risk premium increases for any given I.
Proof: see Appendix.
16Figure 2 illustrates the results in Proposition 4 for the example described in footnote
7 and a discrete change in ®. As ® increases from 0 to 0.1, the U-shaped curve is bent
downwards and inwards, with the right end unchanged at W = ¯ I and I = ¯ I.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Proposition 4 and Figure 2 lead to the empirical prediction that where the relationship
between internal funds and investment is positive, a greater asymmetry of information
should be associated with a greater investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity. This result is intuitive
and validates the standard empirical procedure of classifying ﬁrms in groups of ﬁnancially
more or less constrained ﬁrms.
It also addresses a concern that Kaplan and Zingales (1997) raised against most of the
empirical literature. Kaplan and Zingales argued that since few ﬁrms are truly uncon-
strained, empirical tests designed to compare constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms often
end up comparing more constrained and less constrained ﬁrms instead. They argued that
since theory is silent on the latter comparison, the empirical literature lacks a proper
theoretical foundation. In contrast, Proposition 4 predicts a monotonicity of investment-
cash ﬂow sensitivities in the extent of capital imperfections that alleviates Kaplan and
Zingales’ concern.
Notice, however, that the above prediction is restricted to the range where the re-
lationship between internal funds and investment is positive. Where the relationship is
negative, we obtain the opposite prediction. It follows that greater capital market imper-
fections should be expected to lead to a higher investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity only if a
sample does not include too many ﬁrms that are ﬁnancially weak.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section we test the predictions of our model. We present detailed empirical evidence
of a U-shaped relationship between internal funds and investment (Section 4.2). In Section
4.3, we then revisit some previous empirical results and reinterpret them in the light of
our theoretical predictions. First, we describe our data.
174.1 Data and Variable Deﬁnitions
We construct our data set from annual ﬁnancial statement data gathered from the Re-
search Insight (U.S. Compustat) database. The sample includes observations from all
industries14 over the 1980 to 1999 period.15 Observations from 1980 were used only to
construct variables including lagged terms, and were not used in the regressions.
Three central variables of interest in our analysis are a ﬁrm’s gross investment, cash
ﬂow, and the beginning-of-period equity market-to-book ratio M/B.16 To control for pos-
sible heteroskedasticity due to diﬀerences in ﬁrm size, we divide both investment and cash
ﬂow by beginning-of-period net ﬁxed assets, and denote the resulting variables by I/K
and CF/K. The construction of the variables is described in Table 1.17 Firm-year obser-
vations were deleted if the value for total assets or sales were zero, or if there were missing
values for either of I/K, CF/K, or M/B. To control for outliers due to possible data en-
try mistakes, we truncated our sample by removing observations beyond the 1st and 99th
percentiles for M/B, CF/K and I/K. After that, we are left with 93,923 observations.
Notice that unlike many earlier studies,18 we do not require that each ﬁrm have data
available throughout the entire sample period, i.e. we work with an unbalanced panel of
data. Our data set is unusually comprehensive, covering ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes and ages
from a variety of industries. Summary statistics are presented in the ﬁrst two columns of
Table 1.
[Table 1 about here.]
14 Our results are unchanged if we exclude ﬁnancial ﬁrms (SIC codes 6000-6999) or include only
manufacturing ﬁrms (SIC codes 3000-3999), as earlier studies have done.
15 At the time we obtained the data set, 1999 data were not available for all ﬁrms; our data for that
year is therefore incomplete.
16 As a robustness check, we also added the book value of long-term debt to both the numerator and
denominator of M/B; doing so changes our estimates only marginally.
17 We deﬁne investment as the change in net ﬁxed assets, plus depreciation. Using capital expenditures
(Compustat data item 128) instead leads to very similar results.
18 See e.g. Fazzari et al. (1988), Schaller (1993), Chirinko and Schaller (1995), Gilchrist and Himmelberg
(1995), Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Cleary (1999), or Allayannis and Mozumdar (2001).
18In some regressions in Section 4.3, we use a balanced panel that we extract from our
data set by requiring complete observations for the years 1981 to 1998. This eliminates
a large number of observations, leaving only 20,394. Summary statistics for the balanced
sub-sample are presented in the last two columns of Table 1. A comparison shows that
ﬁrms in this sub-sample tend to be larger (in terms of assets and sales), invest less, have
lower market-to-book ratios, and higher cash ﬂows.
Since our model is static, there is no single correct way to construct a measure of W
for our panel data. Measuring W by using a ﬂow variable such as cash ﬂow, for example,
correctly accounts for current changes in W, but ignores existing funds carried over from
the last period. Measuring W by using a stock variable such as (lagged) cash or working
capital, on the other hand, ignores all recent cash ﬂow that is immediately invested and
therefore never shows up the end-of-period stock variable.19
Rather than try to resolve these problems, we employ diﬀerent imperfect but plausible
measures of W to see whether the results we obtain are similar. Below, we focus on two
measures, a ﬂow and a stock variable. The ﬁrst is cash ﬂow, which has been widely used
in the investment literature, albeit mainly as an explanatory variable in regressions. Here,
we use cash ﬂow also as a criterion to split our data into diﬀerent groups; splitting the
data in this way turns out to lead to the best regression ﬁts among all measures of W we
considered.
Our second measure of internal funds is derived from the “quick ratio” or “acid-test
ratio”, which measures a ﬁrm’s liquidity using assets that can be liquidated reasonably
quickly. Instead of the ratio, however, we use the buﬀer itself, i.e. current assets less
inventories less current liabilities. We divide this measure by beginning-of-period net
ﬁxed assets (as we did with cash ﬂow and investment) and denote it by WC/K (working
capital). Adding current cash ﬂow to WC/K creates a third measure; this does not change
any of our ﬁndings, and so we do not report the results.20
19 Another problem with lagged stock variables is that when investments are ﬁnanced out of external
funds raised in the previous ﬁscal year, the funds show up as part of the ﬁrm’s cash even though in our
model they would not be counted as as part of W.
20 Fazzari et al. (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) also consider cash stock as a possible inﬂuence
19A potential concern is that a negative relationship between internal funds and invest-
ment discovered in the data may be the result of reverse causation since more investment
leads to a decrease in internal funds. However, while each period’s internal funds are
inﬂuenced by a ﬁrm’s past investment levels, we need not worry about an eﬀect from
our measures of W on contemporaneous investment: as is standard in the literature, our
measure of CF/K is a measure of cash ﬂow from operations, which does not include in-
vestment; while WC/K is a beginning-of-period measure anyway. As a robustness check,
we also used lagged CF/K instead of contemporaneous CF/K in the regressions reported
below. The results are qualitatively the same as for contemporaneous CF/K, and are
therefore not reported.
Panel B of Table 1 shows that in the unbalanced sample, 22.4% of observations have
negative cash ﬂow, 35.8% have negative working capital (less inventories), and 25.8% have
a negative sum of WC/K and CF/K. These numbers suggest that ﬁrms with negative
internal funds account for a substantial share of ﬁrms in the economy.
4.2 The U-shaped Investment Curve
We conduct four diﬀerent tests to document the existence of a U-shaped relationship
between internal funds and investment.
1. Mean and median investment levels. The simplest way to detect patterns in
the relationship between internal funds and investment is to plot investment on our two
measures of internal funds. We do so by splitting the observations into ventiles of CF/K
or WC/K, respectively, and computing the mean and median I/K ratios for each ventile.
on investment (see Almeida et al. (2003) for an analysis of how cash ﬂow and cash stocks are related).
Since a ﬁrm’s cash stock cannot be negative, however, it is not an appropriate measure for W because
it does not account for ﬁxed costs or other ﬁnancial obligations that might cause the funds available
for investment to be negative. Therefore, among stock variables, working capital is a more appropriate
measure than cash stock. An alternative (which still does not overcome the problems of using cash stock)
would be to consider the sum of beginning-of-period cash stock and cash ﬂow. Using this measure leads
to results qualitatively similar to those for cash ﬂow and working capital.
20The results are plotted in Figures 3 and 4.
[Figure 3 about here.]
[Figure 4 about here.]
Investment is clearly U-shaped in both CF/K and WC/K. That is, it is monotonically
decreasing at low levels of cash ﬂow or working capital, and monotonically increasing at
higher levels. The picture is the same if we add the two measures (not included). Notice
that the decreasing branches in each graph comprise several ventiles, which means that
the pattern is not caused by a small number of outliers (in terms of internal funds) but
by a substantial share of observations. The patterns are the same for median and mean
investment, suggesting again that they are not caused by outliers.
2. Regression including quadratic term. The investment literature has tradition-
ally regressed investment on proxies for Tobin’s q. Fazzari et al. (1988) ﬁrst suggested
that adding cash ﬂow as an independent variable should increase the explanatory power
of these regressions, arguing that larger internal funds reduce the cost of raising external
funds if ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained. They and many subsequent studies ﬁnd that
investment is sensitive to cash ﬂow. We follow this approach here, and regress investment
on our proxies for W and on the market-to-book ratio (as a proxy for q).
In all of our reported regressions we estimate a model with ﬁxed eﬀects. The resulting
t-statistics are generally very high, largely due to the size of our data set. To control
for possible heteroskedasticity, we repeated our regressions using the Huber-White robust
estimator of variance; this reduces the t-statistics somewhat, but almost all coeﬃcients
remain signiﬁcant at the 1% level. We also tested whether serial correlation may aﬀect
our results, by running all regressions reported in this subsection separately for each year.
The estimated coeﬃcients look very similar to those of our main regressions for practically
every year. The t-statistics are generally lower than before, but the coeﬃcients remain
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level in almost all cases. We conclude from these
robustness checks that our estimates are not aﬀected signiﬁcantly by heteroskedasticity
or serial correlation.
[Table 2 about here.]
21The ﬁrst column of Table 2 presents the coeﬃcients for the regression of I/K on
M/B and CF/K. The cash ﬂow coeﬃcient is very small, as is the adjusted R2 of 1.1%.21
This result is is inconsistent with earlier ﬁndings but consistent with our theory: if the
relationship between internal funds and investment is U-shaped, then the average slope
will depend on the sample composition, and should not be expected to be large.
A standard procedure to test for non-monotonicities is to augment the regression with
a squared term. When we add the square of CF/K as an explanatory variable, we ﬁnd
that the coeﬃcients for both CF/K and its square are positive and signiﬁcant, cf. column 2
of Table 2. Also, the explanatory power is increased considerably by adding the quadratic
CF/K term, with the adjusted R2 increasing to 6.8%. Repeating the experiment for
WC/K instead of CF/K yields similar but less strong results; cf. columns 3 and 4 of
Table 2. While the quadratic regression leads to the expected results, the ﬁt is not great.
A better way to detect the predicted nonlinearities in the data is to use spline regressions.
3. Spline regressions. We divide our sample into quantiles of either CF/K or WC/K
and estimate investment as a piecewise linear and continuous function of CF/K or WC/K
(cf. Greene (2003, p.121-122)). Table 3 presents the estimates for below- and above-
median CF/K in column 1, and for quintiles of CF/K in column 2. Columns 3 and 4
show the coeﬃcients for analogous spline regressions on WC/K. The ﬁndings for 3, 4 and
10 quantiles are similar, so we do not report them.
[Table 3 about here.]
Recall that Proposition 2 predicts that investment as a function of internal funds has
a unique minimum, but does not predict that the relationship must be convex in either
the downward- or the upward-sloping part of the curve. The theory also predicts that
I = I¤ for W ¸ W ¤, cf. Figure 1. This implies that the empirical relationship between
internal funds and investment should be become ﬂatter for observations with high levels
of internal funds, as they may include ﬁrms that are ﬁnancially unconstrained.
All of these predictions are borne out in the spline regressions. The coeﬃcients for
21 The t-statistic is also small, compared with most of the other t-statistics in our regressions.
22the lowest quantiles are negative, while they are positive for higher quantiles. This is true
even for the below/above-median regressions, suggesting that the U-shape is not driven by
outliers. Consistent with the theoretical prediction for unconstrained ﬁrms, the coeﬃcients
are positive and decreasing among the highest quintiles. We also report the t-statistics of
the diﬀerences between coeﬃcients of adjacent quantiles. The diﬀerences are signiﬁcant in
every regression, which underlines the non-linear nature of the investment/internal funds
relationship.22
4. Split-sample regressions. Finally, we follow the standard empirical approach of
splitting our sample into sub-samples, running separate regressions for each of them,
and comparing the coeﬃcients. This approach was pioneered by Fazzari et al. (1988)
to compare the behavior of ﬁnancially constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms. Here, we
use it to test whether investment is a U-shaped function of internal funds. Given our
predictions, a natural way to split our sample is into positive or negative observations of
CF/K or WC/K.
[Table 4 about here.]
Table 4 presents the estimates. Columns 1 to 3 display coeﬃcients for regressions of
I/K on CF/K and M/B, while columns 4 to 6 display those for regressions of I/K on
WC/K and M/B. As expected, the coeﬃcients for CF/K and WC/K are positive for the
sub-sample with positive observations (columns 2 and 5), negative for the sub-sample
with negative observations (columns 3 and 6), and in between when using all data in one
regression (columns 1 and 4).
For the split-sample regressions (Table 4 and subsequent tables), we also test whether
measurement problems concerning Tobin’s q bias our estimates. The mainstream empiri-
22 Similar to the results of Fazzari et al. (1988) and many others, our cash ﬂow coeﬃcients are positive
even for the ﬁrms with the highest cash ﬂows, which are arguably the ﬁnancially least constrained ones.
One possible explanation is that only few ﬁrms are truly ﬁnancially unconstrained, cf. Fazzari et al. (2000)
for this line of argument. Another possibility is that a non-zero coeﬃcient is a result of mismeasuring
q by using the market-to-book ratio as a proxy. Below we present evidence that our estimates are not
seriously aﬄicted by the latter problem, though.
23cal approach pioneered by Fazzari et al. (1988) has come under sharp attack by Erickson
and Whited (2000) and Gomes (2001), and more recently by Alti (2003) and Moyen
(2003). These authors argue that positive investment-cash ﬂow coeﬃcients may be en-
tirely the result of errors in accounting for ﬁrms’ investment opportunities by using e.g.
the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for Tobin’s q. Our theory is immune to this criticism
because in our model the ﬁrm’s investment opportunities are held ﬁxed. The evidence
we present, on the other hand, is more vulnerable to this criticism. To alleviate concerns
about measurement error, we conduct a test proposed by Erickson and Whited (2001).
The results suggest that the positive or negative sign of our coeﬃcients is very unlikely
to be caused by measurement error alone.
Erickson and Whited estimate how much variation in diﬀerent commonly used proxies
for q is due to variation in “true q”. Denote this coeﬃcient by ¿2. Ideally, ¿2 equals unity,
and the following is an identity:






where ¹MB CF and R2
MB CF are the cash ﬂow coeﬃcient and the R2 for a regression of
M/B on CF/K, ¹ICF is the cash ﬂow coeﬃcient for a regression of I/K on CF/K, and
¯CF and ¯MB are the cash ﬂow and M/B coeﬃcients for a regression of I/K on M/B and
CF/K, i.e. the main regression we are interested in.
In practice, however, ¿2 is less than one, and the lower ¿2, the more likely it is that
estimated cash ﬂow coeﬃcients are aﬄicted by measurement error. Erickson and Whited
(2001) estimate that ¿2 lies in the range of 20%-40%, depending on what proxy is used.
Following their suggested approach, we report a coeﬃcient ¿2
min for each regression in
Table 4 and all subsequent tables. We calculate ¿2
min as the value of ¿2 for which the right-
hand side of (12) is zero.23 In almost all regressions, ¿2
min is in the single digits, which
compared to Erickson and Whited’s estimated 20%-40% for ¿2 suggests that measurement
error, although probably present, cannot alone explain the non-zero coeﬃcients that we
obtain.24
23 Negative values of ¿2
min are obtained if some of the coeﬃcients in (12) are negative.
24 This also suggests that the equity market-to-book ratio that we use as a proxy for Tobin’s q is a
24We conclude from our four tests that there is substantial support in the data for
our prediction of a U-shaped relationship between internal funds and investment, an in
particular, of a negative relationship for low levels of internal funds.
4.3 Relationship With Previous Findings
We now discuss how and why the results presented here diﬀer from those reported in other
studies. Both sample selection and the criteria used to classify ﬁrms play an important
role in explaining the diﬀerences. The choice of criteria to classify ﬁrms, and the diﬀerent
predictions obtained from our theoretical analysis, also help to resolve a recent controversy
in the empirical literature. In the course of our discussion, we reproduce apparently
conﬂicting ﬁndings within our data, demonstrating that the ﬁndings are consistent with
our predictions and with one another.
The most striking diﬀerence between our ﬁndings and those of other studies is that
we ﬁnd a negative relationship between investment and cash ﬂow or working capital for
a substantial share of observations. A main reason why other studies do not document a
negative relationship is that many of them eliminate observations for ﬁnancially weaker
ﬁrms, and thereby eliminate many observations in which ﬁrms have negative internal
funds. For example, Fazzari et al. (1988) include only ﬁrms that have positive real sales
growth in each year. Many studies (including Fazzari et al. (1988)) work with balanced
panels, i.e. eliminate ﬁrms from the sample if data are not available for each year during
the sample period. Our model predicts that eliminating a large share of observations with
negative internal funds will lead to a higher estimated sensitivity of investment to proxies
for W; cf. Proposition 2.
Our regressions support this prediction. For example, recall that the cash ﬂow coef-
ﬁcient for the whole sample is .004, cf. Table 2. In contrast, the same regression using a
balanced sub-sample (see Section 4.1) leads to a much larger coeﬃcient of .18 (not tabled;
t-statistic 35.45). Similarly, in almost all other regressions the cash ﬂow coeﬃcients for
reasonable proxy. As mentioned, adding the book value of long-term debt to both the numerator and
denominator of M/B has little eﬀect on our ﬁndings.
25the balanced panel are higher than the corresponding ones for the unbalanced panel.25
(See e.g. the estimates reported in Table 5) below; we omit other comparisons.)
Fazzari et al. (1988) argued that the investment of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms should
vary with cash ﬂow while that of unconstrained ﬁrms should not. As Kaplan and Zin-
gales (1997) point out however, identifying truly unconstrained ﬁrms is diﬃcult, implying
that in practice, the split-sample approach amounts to comparing more and less ﬁnan-
cially constrained ﬁrms. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue that theory is silent on the
latter comparison, which raises doubts about the theoretical foundation for the standard
empirical approach.
Our model ﬁlls this gap in the theory. Proposition 4 conﬁrms Kaplan and Zingales’
general point that from a theoretical perspective, more constrained ﬁrms may have a
higher or lower investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity. Nevertheless, it also validates the es-
timation procedure of Fazzari et al. (1988) and others: if, e.g. as a result of balancing,
there are not many ﬁrms with negative internal funds in the data, then more constrained
ﬁrms should indeed show a higher investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity, cf. the upward sloping
branches of the investment curves in Figure 2. That is exactly what most empirical studies
ﬁnd. Our own data conﬁrm this prediction and underline the role of sample selection.
Following Fazzari et al. (1988), we use the payout ratio as a proxy for the degree of
asymmetric information between ﬁrms and their investors. Fazzari et al. (1988) compared
groups of ﬁrms whose payoﬀ ratios fell into certain ranges for at least ten out of ﬁfteen
years. This procedure can not easily be applied to unbalanced panels; we therefore classify
individual ﬁrm-years, which also has the advantage that we can capture changes in payout
decisions over time.26 Speciﬁcally, groups FHPVary1, FHPVary2 and FHPVary3 in the
regressions reported below include ﬁrm-years with payout ratios below 10%; between 10%
and 20%, above 20%, respectively. Since dividends are zero in many observations, we
25 See also Allayannis and Mozumdar (2001), who argue that the inclusion of negative-cash ﬂow ob-
servations explains why the results of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999) diﬀer from those of
Fazzari et al. (1988).
26 As a robustness check, we replicate Fazzari et al.’s approach using the balanced sub-sample; the
results are very similar to those described below, and we therefore do not report them.
26additionally consider a subset of FHPVary1 called FHPVary1strict, which includes ﬁrm-
years with strictly positive payout ratios (but below 10%). Finally, the FHPVary1&2
group is the union of FHPVary1 and FHPVary2; it includes ﬁrm-years with payout ratios
below 20%.
[Table 5 about here.]
The regression results for these groups are reported Table 5. Panel A displays the
estimates for the unbalanced panel. We ﬁnd little evidence resembling that of Fazzari et
al. (1988): while ﬁrms with the highest payout ratios (FHPVary3) have a lower cash-ﬂow
sensitivity than those in the lower-payout groups (FHPVary2 and FHPVary1strict), the
sensitivities are actually lowest where the payout is lowest, in groups FHPVary1 as well
as FHPVary1&2. In contrast, the results for the balanced panel (Panel B of Table 5)
are more in line with Fazzari et al. (1988): Both the FHPVary2 and FHPVary1strict
groups have a higher cash ﬂow coeﬃcient than the FHPVary3 group, but the coeﬃcient
for the FHPVary1 group is still the lowest of all. Only if we additionally eliminate
observations with negative cash ﬂow (Panel C of Table 5), the lowest coeﬃcient is that
for the FHPVary3 group, as predicted. But the coeﬃcient for the FHPVary1 group is
still lower than that of the FHPVary2 group, i.e. there is no monotonicity between payout
ratios and investment-cash ﬂow sensitivities. This is reversed if we ignore ﬁrms with a
payout ratio of zero, which allows for a better comparison with the ﬁndings reported in
Fazzari et al. (1988) (their sample contains very few observations with zero dividends): the
FHPVary1strict group then has the highest coeﬃcient, the FHPVary3 group the lowest,
and the coeﬃcient for the FHPVary2 group is in between.
Sample selection explains why the cash ﬂow coeﬃcients obtained in other studies are
always positive while ours are not. In contrast, it is the choice of methods to classify
ﬁrms that lies at the heart of a recent controversy in the investment literature. It is a
controversy about the usefulness of comparing cash ﬂow coeﬃcients for groups of ﬁrms
identiﬁed as more or less ﬁnancially constrained. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue that
the empirical approach devised by Fazzari et al. (1988) is not well grounded in theory,
and provide evidence in apparent conﬂict to Fazzari et al.; similar and stronger evidence
27is presented in Cleary (1999).
Fazzari et al. (2000) argued that the results of Kaplan and Zingales are attributable
to their diﬀerent method of identifying ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. That is, Fazzari et
al. (1988) and many others classify ﬁrms according to criteria (such as the payout ratio)
thought to be related to the capital market imperfections faced by a ﬁrm.27 In contrast,
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999) construct indices of ﬁnancial health that
are based on measures of ﬁnancial strength according to traditional ﬁnancial ratios, and
hence are likely to be correlated with a ﬁrm’s internal funds. Fazzari et al. (2000) and
Kaplan and Zingales (2000) did not agree, however, on the implications of this distinction.
Our theory is the ﬁrst to explain why the diﬀerent criteria used to classify ﬁrms should
lead to the diﬀerent results reported in the literature. When ﬁrms are classiﬁed according
to the capital market imperfections they face (captured in our model by informational
asymmetry), and when the ﬁnancially weakest ﬁrms are excluded, we predict a higher
investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity for the more constrained ﬁrms. Above, we presented
evidence similar to that of Fazzari et al. (1988) in support of this prediction. On the other
hand, when ﬁrms are classiﬁed by their internal funds, then the U-shaped investment curve
leads to the prediction that among the ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, the more constrained
ones will have a lower investment-cash ﬂow sensitivity. Thus, the results of Kaplan and
Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999) are neither an anomaly nor evidence of the uselessness
of cash-ﬂow sensitivities. Most likely, instead, they are pieces of evidence of a U-shaped
relationship between internal funds and investment.
In addition to the results of Fazzari et al. (1988), our data also conﬁrm the results of
Cleary (1999), demonstrating that there is no contradiction between them.28 We follow
the approach outlined in Cleary (1999) and refer the reader to that paper for more details.
We use discriminant analysis to construct the Z-score for each ﬁrm-year, which is an
index of the likelihood that the ﬁrm will increase its dividend. The variables used for
27 For a survey see Hubbard (1998).
28 We replicate the approach of Cleary (1999) rather than that of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) because
the latter is too work-intensive for a large sample, and because it has been criticized as too subjective.
28the discriminant analysis are the current ratio, debt ratio, interest coverage, net income
margin, sales growth, and return on equity.29 Since many of these variables are closely
related to internal funds, the Z-score is an index of ﬁnancial strength, in contrast to
Fazzari et al.’s use of payout ratios.
As a by-product of the discriminant analysis, each observation is assigned to one of two
groups, ﬁrms likely to increase dividends (the PreGrp1 group) or ﬁrms likely to decrease
dividends (the PreGrp2 group). We also rank the observations by their Z-score and
form three additional groups of approximately equal size: ﬁnancially constrained (FC),
possibly ﬁnancially constrained (PFC) and not ﬁnancially constrained (NFC). Computing
traditional ﬁnancial ratios for each of these ﬁve groups (not reported) conﬁrms that the
groups are indeed a reasonable way to classify ﬁrms according to their ﬁnancial status.
Table 6 presents the estimated coeﬃcients from split-sample regressions for the various
groups, which conﬁrm the ﬁndings in Cleary (1999): ﬁrms that are classiﬁed as possibly or
not ﬁnancially constrained (the PFC and NFC groups) have a higher cash ﬂow coeﬃcient
than ﬁrms classiﬁed as ﬁnancially constrained (the FC group). Similarly, ﬁrms classiﬁed
as likely to increase dividends (the PreGrp1 group) have a larger cash ﬂow coeﬃcient than
ﬁrms in the PreGrp2, which are likely to decrease dividends. (Using the balanced panel
produces similar ﬁndings, and we therefore do not report the estimates.)
We have thus shown that the ﬁndings of both Fazzari et al. (1988) and Cleary (1999)
can be reproduced using the same data set, i.e. that there is no conﬂict between them. The
key to obtaining estimates consistent with Fazzari et al. (1988) is to classify ﬁrms using a
proxy for the degree of asymmetric information in the capital markets, and to eliminate
ﬁrms of below-average ﬁnancial strength. The key to obtaining ﬁndings consistent with
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Cleary (1999) is to use an index related to internal funds
to classify ﬁrms.
Arguably, the evidence supporting Fazzari et al. (1988) is not very strong. This should
29 This is a slight modiﬁcation of the method in Cleary (1999) due to data constraints; for the same
reason, discriminant analysis was performed on the balanced sub-sample, and the coeﬃcient estimates
were then applied to the entire unbalanced sample to obtain the Z-scores.
29not be mistaken as a sign that the empirical approach is ﬂawed, though. Instead, the
problem is that it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd good proxies for capital market imperfections that
vary enough across observations in the sample (especially with Compustat data, where all
ﬁrms are publicly traded). A ﬁrm’s internal funds, on the other hand, are relatively easier
to measure. A simple explanation for our mixed results could then be that econometrically,
the eﬀects of ﬁnancial status dominate those of capital market imperfections.
4.4 Alternative Explanations
As discussed in Section 4.2, a number of authors have argued that the conﬂicting results of
Fazzari et al. (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) may mean little economically because
of ﬂaws in the empirical approach devised used by Fazzari et al. (1988) and others. In
contrast, and similar to our approach, some other recent papers oﬀer diﬀerent theoretical
explanations for the contrasting empirical ﬁndings, treating the reported ﬁndings as at
least qualitatively valid.
For instance, studying a dynamic model of investment, Boyle and Guthrie (2003) argue
that an increase in internal funds loosens a ﬁrm’s restrictions on current investment, but
also makes it less likely that the ﬁrm will face restrictions in the future. The latter eﬀect
increases the opportunity cost of current investment, and is greatest for a ﬁrm with low
liquidity. This may give rise to investment cash-ﬂow sensitivities that are increasing in
a ﬁrm’s internal funds, consistent with the evidence of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and
Cleary (1999).
Dasgupta and Sengupta (2003) emphasize a similar tradeoﬀ between current and de-
layed investment, within a model in which the ﬁrm’s investment decision is subject to
moral hazard. They obtain a nonmonotonic relationship between internal funds and in-
vestment. In particular, investment is decreasing over some range of internal funds. At
lower and at higher levels, however, investment is increasing.
Moyen (2003) compares two dynamic models, one of an unconstrained ﬁrm that has
access to capital markets, and one of a constrained ﬁrm that does not (a setup similar
to that in Almeida and Campello (2001)). An unconstrained ﬁrm exhibits a greater
30investment cash-ﬂow sensitivity than a constrained ﬁrm because a ﬁrm with higher cash
ﬂow also issues more debt to fund additional investment. This prediction is in line with
the results of Kaplan and Zingales. Moreover, in the model a higher debt level of an
unconstrained ﬁrm goes along with a lower dividend. This leads to the prediction that if
ﬁrms are identiﬁed as ﬁnancially constrained according to their low dividend levels, one
obtains the results of Fazzari et al., although for a very diﬀerent reason. Simulating her
model using parameters calibrated from data, Moyen ﬁnds support for these predictions.
None of these alternative explanations is incompatible with ours. As we have shown,
however, the conﬂicting results in the empirical literature can be fully resolved using a
single, simple, static model. In addition, our model generates a new prediction (a decreas-
ing investment curve for low levels of internal funds), which, too, is strongly supported
by the data.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a model in which a ﬁrm’s optimal investment is a U-
shaped function of its internal funds. Intuitively, when internal funds are suﬃciently
negative, the ﬁrm needs to raise external funds for two purposes, to close a ﬁnancing gap
and to make a revenue-generating investment. The larger the ﬁnancing gap, the more
the ﬁrm has to invest, since only a larger investment can generate the revenue needed to
repay the investor, which is necessary for the investor to be willing to provide funds in
the ﬁrst place.
Three main assumptions lead to a U-shaped investment curve: internal funds can be
negative; the ﬁrm’s investment is scalable; and the cost of external funds is determined en-
dogenously by accounting for the investor’s participation constraint. In contrast, the stan-
dard prediction of a positive relationship between internal funds and investment follows
either from making restrictive assumptions about a ﬁrm’s internal funds or investment
opportunities, or from ignoring investors’ incentives to provide external funds.
Analyzing a large data set, we ﬁnd strong empirical support for our predictions. In
particular, investment is negatively related to diﬀerent measures of internal funds for a
31substantial share of observations with very low internal funds. Thus, investment with
negative internal funds is not only a theoretical possibility but empirically important.
Our theory and evidence highlight the importance of distinguishing between capital
market imperfections and a lack of own funds as two diﬀerent dimensions of ﬁnancial
constraints. While we are not the ﬁrst to make this distinction, our theory is the ﬁrst to
oﬀer testable predictions for each dimension. The theory shows that the role of internal
funds is quite diﬀerent from that of capital market imperfections, which explains why
our empirical results look quite diﬀerent from those reported elsewhere. Our theory and
evidence also help to resolve a recent controversy over conﬂicting ﬁndings in the empirical
investment literature.
32Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2
Substituting F(I; b µ) for D into (5) and (3) and setting up a Lagrangian leads to the
ﬁrst-order conditions










!(µ)dµ + (1 ¡ Ω(b µ))FI(I; b µ) ¡ 1
)
= 0;







Fµ(I; b µ) = 0 (A2)
and (3). Using (A2), eliminate ¸ = 1=[1 ¡ ¼2¡L
¼2 Ω(b µ)] in (A1), and the optimal I and b µ
are the solution to the system









FI(I;µ)!(µ)dµ ¡ 1 = 0 (A3)









+ (1 ¡ Ω(b µ))F(I; b µ) ¡ I + W = 0
Borrowing is feasible for W if there exist I and b µ such that W, I and b µ solve (A3) and
(A4). Then, it is easy to see that both (W;I; b µ) = (¯ I; ¯ I;µ) and (W;I; b µ) = (W; ¯ I; ¯ µ) are
feasible, since in both cases (A3) reduces to the ﬁrst-order condition of an unconstrained
ﬁrm, the solution to which is ¯ I.




















!(µ)dµ + (1 ¡ Ω(b µ))FI(I; b µ) ¡ 1
gb µ = ¡!(b µ)¼2¡L







gW = 0 and hW = 1
33Then, we have IW = ¡(gWhµ¡hWgµ)=(gIhµ¡hIgµ). The denominator is negative because






fE[FI(I;µ)] ¡ FI(I; b µ)g;
implying that hIgb µ is positive. The numerator reduces to ¡gb µ; hence IW has the same
sign as E[FI(I;µ)] ¡ FI(I; b µ).
We now show that IWW > 0 when IW = 0, which implies that I(W) has a unique




IW + gIIWW +
dgb µ
dW
b µW + gb µ
b µWW = 0
dhI
dW
IW + hIIWW +
dhb µ
dW
b µW + hb µ
b µWW = 0
Where IW = 0, we have
IWW = ¡
µdgb µ










gIhb µ ¡ hIgb µ
;
where the second equation follows because gb µ = 0 when IW = 0 (cf. 3. above). Again, the
denominator is negative; moreover we have
dgb µ
dW
= gIb µIW + gb µb µ
b µW + gb µW = gb µb µ
b µW < 0;
since the ﬁrst and third terms vanish. Thus,
IWW = ¡
gb µb µhb µ[b µW]2
gIhb µ ¡ hIgb µ
;
which has the same sign as
gb µb µ = ¡!
0(b µ)
h
E[FI(I;µ)] ¡ FI(I; b µ)
i
+ !(b µ)FIµ(I; b µ);
which in turn is positive because the term in [ ] vanishes when IW = 0.
Finally, we show that f W < 0 by proving that I(W) must be increasing at W = 0,
from which the claim follows because I(W) has a unique minimum. Deﬁne b h(I; b µ) as the















F(I; b µ) ¡ I
















FI(I; b µ) ¡ 1 < 0:






fE[FI(I;µ)] ¡ FI(I; b µ)g:
Thus, if hI < 0 at W = 0, then we must have E[FI(I;µ)] > FI(I; b µ), implying that I(W)
must be upward-sloping at W = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
Since i(I;W) =
D(I;W)
I¡W ¡ 1, and given some dI
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1 ¡ Ω(b µ)¼2¡L
¼2
i
F(I; b µ) ¡ I + W
´
; (A7)
(where D = F(I; b µ)). If dI
dW = 0, the ﬁrst term in (A7) vanishes, and a comparison
with the investor’s participation constraint (3) shows that the second term is negative. If
dI
dW = 1, the second term in (A7) vanishes, and di















35FIµ(I;µ) > 0 8I;µ and F(I;µ) = 0 8I imply that FI(I;µ) > 0 8I;µ, and therefore that
di
dW < 0 in this case, too.
Proof of Proposition 4
Part (a): Setting up a Lagrangian as in Proposition 2, but with (10) as constraint, leads
to the ﬁrst-order conditions
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Fµ(I; b µ) = 0; (A10)






which can be substituted into (A9). The optimal I and b µ are the solution to the system
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h(I; b µ;W;®) = (10): (A13)
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:
36It is easy to repeat the steps in the proof of Proposition 2 for the model with ® > 0, and
to ﬁnd that dI




g®hb µ ¡ h®gb µ
gIhb µ ¡ hIgb µ
: (A14)
The denominator is negative, and so is g®hb µ; furthermore, h®gb µ is positive if [E[FI(I;µ)]¡
(1 ¡ ®)FI(I; b µ)] is positive, i.e. if dI
dW > 0; this implies that if dI
dW > 0, then dI
d® < 0.
Part (b): Diﬀerentiate the system gIIW + gb µ
b µW = 0 and hIIW + hb µ
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dhI
d®
IW + hIIW® +
dhb µ
d®
b µW + hb µ
b µW® = 0: (A16)




















At W = ¯ I, we have b µ = µ, and therefore g® = h® = 0. It follows that I® = b µ® = 0,
and hence the total derivatives in (A17) reduce to the partial derivatives:
dgI
d® = gI®
etc. Moreover, at W = ¯ I, we have gI® = hI® = hb µ® = 0 and gb µ® = !(b µ)fE[FI(I;µ)] ¡
FI(I; b µ)g < 0. Then, (A17) reduces to gb µ®
b µWhb µ > 0. By continuity, the same must be
true over some interval of W for W < ¯ I.
Part (c): The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3. If we vary ® instead of W, while
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40Table 1: Summary Statistics
Summary Statistics for the Unbalanced Sample and the Balanced Sub-Sample. The construction of the
variables using Compustat “data” items is explained below each variable (the preﬁx L. refers to a lagged
variable). The unbalanced sample includes data from the whole sample period (1981-99) after eliminating
observations beyond 1/99 percentiles for I/K, CF/K and M/B. The balanced panel consists of all ﬁrms
for which data are available for the years 1981-1998.
(A) Means and Medians for Selected Variables
Unbalanced Balanced
Mean Median Mean Median
Net Fixed Assets ($m) 492 18 1,266 124
data8
I/K, Investment 0.449 0.239 0.263 0.191
(data8–L.data8+data14)/L.data8)
CF/K, Cash Flow 0.083 0.253 0.387 0.285
(data14+data18)/L.data8)
M/B, Market-to-Book Ratio 2.506 1.663 1.923 1.529
(L.data199£L.data25)/L.data60)
WC/K, working capital 1.298 0.177 0.461 0.085
(L.data4–L.data5–L.data3)/L.data8)
WC/K + CF/K 1.295 0.384 0.840 0.367
WC/K + CF/K
Total Assets ($m) 1,679 89 3,095 366
data6
Sales ($m) 1,067 84 2,737 423
data12
Sales Growth 0.471 0.089 0.123 0.069
(data12–L.data12)/L.data12)
Payout Ratio 0.076 0.000 0.044 0.139
L.data21/L.data178
Leverage 0.254 0.217 0.242 0.234
(L.data9+L.data34)/L.data6
Current Ratio 3.09 1.98 2.52 1.88
L.data4/L.data5
ROE, Return on Equity -0.047 0.089 0.085 0.119
L.data18/L.data60
TIE, Interest Coverage Ratio 16.0 2.9 28.2 4.3
L.data178/L.data15
Data Composition and Availability
Unbalanced Balanced
Observations with ... Number Of these negative Number Of these negative
CF/K 93,923 21,028 22.4% 20,394 1,255 6.2%
WC/K 84,575 30,277 35.8% 19,595 7,697 39.3%
WC/K + CF/K 84,575 21,845 25.8% 19,595 3,168 16.2%
41Table 2: Regression Estimates Including Square of CF/K or WC/K
Values reported are ﬁxed eﬀect (within) regression estimates over the whole sample period (1981-99)
after eliminating observations beyond 1/99 percentiles for I/K, CF/K and M/B. See Table 1 for details
on the construction of variables. Capital expenditure (normalized by net ﬁxed assets) is the dependent
variable. One of the independent variables is the market-to-book ratio (M/B). Additional independent
variables are cash ﬂow (CF/K) (in equations (1) and (2)) and its square (in equation (2)) and working
capital (WC/K) (in equations (3) and (4)) and its square (in equation (4)).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Only CF/K Only WC/K









M/B 0.029 0.025 0.028 0.028
[29.0]¤¤¤ [26.0]¤¤¤ [27.6]¤¤¤ [28.0]¤¤¤
Constant 0.377 0.329 0.357 0.353
[113.6]¤¤¤ [99.8]¤¤¤ [101.6]¤¤¤ [100.3]¤¤¤
Number of Observations 93,923 93,923 84,575 84,575
Number of ﬁrms 14,399 14,399 12,617 12,617
Adj. R2 1.1% 6.8% 2.8% 3.1%
t-statistics in brackets. ¤¤¤, ¤¤ and ¤: signiﬁcance levels at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
42Table 3: Spline Regression Estimates
Values reported are ﬁxed eﬀect (within) regression estimates over the whole sample period (1981-99) after
eliminating observations beyond 1/99 percentiles for I/K, CF/K and M/B. See Table 1 for details on the
construction of variables. Capital expenditure (normalized by net ﬁxed assets) is the dependent variable;
the independent variables are the market-to-book ratio (M/B) and either cash ﬂow (CF/K) or working
capital (WC/K).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CF/K below / CF/K WC/K below / WC/K
above median quintiles above median quintiles
CF/K, Quantile 1 -0.091 -0.110
[51.68]¤¤¤ [60.11]¤¤¤
CF/K, Quantile 2 0.276 0.106
[82.84]¤¤¤ [2.25]¤¤
[90.17]¤¤¤ [4.54]¤¤¤
CF/K, Quantile 3 1.029
[16.84]¤¤¤
[9.53]¤¤¤
CF/K, Quantile 4 0.733
[25.14]¤¤¤
[3.70]¤¤¤
CF/K, Quantile 5 0.201
[52.74]¤¤¤
[17.46]¤¤¤
WC/K, Quantile 1 -0.005 -0.008
[8.17]¤¤¤ [12.95]¤¤¤
WC/K, Quantile 2 0.030 0.086
[54.12]¤¤¤ [1.66]¤
[41.22]¤¤¤ [1.82]¤
WC/K, Quantile 3 0.302
[8.51]¤¤¤
[2.78]¤¤¤
WC/K, Quantile 4 0.411
[40.46]¤¤¤
[2.62]¤¤¤
WC/K, Quantile 5 0.023
[40.51]¤¤¤
[37.82]¤¤¤
M/B 0.022 0.018 0.029 0.029
[22.83]¤¤¤ [19.62]¤¤¤ [29.48]¤¤¤ [29.98]¤¤¤
Constant 0.256 0.103 0.323 0.140
[74.47]¤¤¤ [15.43]¤¤¤ [90.40]¤¤¤ [20.23]¤¤¤
Number of Observations 93,923 93,923 84,575 84,575
Number of ﬁrms 14,399 14,399 12,617 12,617
Adj. R2 10.2% 12.4% 5.0% 8.8%
t-statistics for diﬀerence from zero and (below) diﬀerence from preceding coeﬃcient in brackets. ¤¤¤, ¤¤
and ¤: signiﬁcance levels at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
43Table 4: Split-Sample Regression Estimates
Values reported are ﬁxed eﬀect (within) regression estimates over the whole sample period (1981-99) after
eliminating observations beyond 1/99 percentiles for I/K, CF/K and M/B. See Table 1 for details on the
construction of variables. Capital expenditure (normalized by net ﬁxed assets) is the dependent variable;
the independent variables are the market-to-book ratio (M/B) and either cash ﬂow (CF/K) or working
capital (WC/K).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Pos CF/K Neg CF/K All Pos WC/K Neg WC/K
CF/K 0.004 0.287 -0.105
[2.60]¤¤¤ [89.74]¤¤¤ [35.50]¤¤¤
WC/K 0.015 0.030 -0.009
[35.28]*** [48.26]*** [14.09]***
MB 0.029 0.023 0.012 0.028 0.040 0.019
[28.96]¤¤¤ [19.54]¤¤¤ [6.02]¤¤¤ [27.65]*** [26.48]*** [14.73]***
Constant 0.377 0.180 0.212 0.357 0.345 0.240
[113.57]¤¤¤ [46.30]¤¤¤ [19.38]¤¤¤ [101.61]*** [64.01]*** [55.63]***
Number of Observations 93,923 72,836 21,028 84,575 54,290 30,277
Number of ﬁrms 14,399 12,007 7,703 12,617 10,642 7,169
Adj. R2 1.1% 12.9% 9.0% 2.8% 6.4% 1.7%
¿2
min 26.75% 4.20% 0.66% 0.95% -1.16% -4.44%
t-statistics in brackets. ¤¤¤, ¤¤ and ¤: signiﬁcance levels at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
44Table 5: Regression Estimates For Payout Groups
Values reported in Panel A are ﬁxed eﬀect (within) regression estimates over the whole sample period
(1981-99) after eliminating observations beyond 1/99 percentiles for I/K, CF/K and M/B. Values reported
in Panels B and C are ﬁxed eﬀect (within) regression estimates for the balanced panel data set, extracted
from the unbalanced panel data set by requiring that ﬁrms’ data are available for the years 1981-1998.
See Table 1 for details on the construction of variables. Capital expenditure (normalized by net ﬁxed
assets) is the dependent variable; the independent variables are the market-to-book ratio (M/B) and cash
ﬂow (CF/K).
(A) Payout Groups, Unbalanced Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FHPVary1 FHPVary2 FHPVary3 FHPVary1&2 FHPVary1strict
CF/K -0.003 0.344 0.231 0.000 0.318
[1.64] [31.84]¤¤¤ [34.15]¤¤¤ [0.21] [30.11]¤¤¤
M/B 0.030 0.014 0.002 0.030 0.020
[24.24]¤¤¤ [3.87]¤¤¤ [0.99] [26.16]¤¤¤ [4.33]¤¤¤
Constant 0.448 0.073 0.123 0.421 0.137
[98.61]¤¤¤ [7.41]¤¤¤ [23.93]¤¤¤ [105.29]¤¤¤ [10.31]¤¤¤
Number of Obs. 65,206 10,805 16,072 76,011 8,461
Number of ﬁrms 12,326 3,052 3,256 13,593 2,507
Adj. R2 1.1% 12.2% 8.5% 1.1% 14.2%
¿2
min -56.9% 3.1% 1.0% 63.0% 3.8%
(B) Payout Groups, Balanced Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FHPVary1 FHPVary2 FHPVary3 FHPVary1&2 FHPVary1strict
CF/K 0.169 0.462 0.229 0.179 0.338
[22.35]¤¤¤ [23.16]¤¤¤ [20.50]¤¤¤ [28.14]¤¤¤ [18.23]¤¤¤
M/B 0.035 0.012 -0.001 0.035 0.022
[11.19]¤¤¤ [2.42]¤¤ [0.46] [13.68]¤¤¤ [2.82]¤¤¤
Constant 0.191 0.039 0.113 0.164 0.135
[23.60]¤¤¤ [3.24]¤¤¤ [21.48]¤¤¤ [25.63]¤¤¤ [8.21]¤¤¤
Number of Obs. 8,504 4,400 7,490 12,904 3,130
Number of ﬁrms 759 732 834 1,001 580
Adj. R2 8.3% 14.2% 6.1% 8.5% 13.7%
¿2
min 7.5% 8.6% 3.1% 8.3% 12.7%
(C) Payout Groups, Balanced Panel, Positive CF/K Observations Only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FHPVary1 FHPVary2 FHPVary3 FHPVary1&2 FHPVary1strict
CF/K 0.306 0.465 0.241 0.308 0.488
[28.96]¤¤¤ [23.10]¤¤¤ [20.94]¤¤¤ [36.08]¤¤¤ [22.59]¤¤¤
M/B 0.028 0.011 -0.002 0.028 0.013
[8.20]¤¤¤ [2.34]¤¤ [1.11] [10.32]¤¤¤ [1.74]¤
Constant 0.130 0.037 0.111 0.109 0.067
[13.89]¤¤¤ [3.08]¤¤¤ [20.75]¤¤¤ [15.36]¤¤¤ [3.89]¤¤¤
Number of Obs. 7,366 4,382 7,382 11,748 2,906
Number of ﬁrms 753 729 826 999 555
Adj. R2 13.7% 14.2% 6.4% 13.2% 19.9%
¿2
min 9.3% 8.5% 2.7% 9.9% 10.2%
t-statistics in brackets. ¤¤¤, ¤¤ and ¤: signiﬁcance levels at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
45Table 6: Regression Estimates For Cleary (1999) Groups
Values reported are ﬁxed eﬀect (within) regression estimates over the whole sample period (1981-99) after
eliminating observations beyond 1/99 percentiles for I/K, CF/K and M/B. See Table 1 for details on the
construction of variables. Capital expenditure (normalized by net ﬁxed assets) is the dependent variable;
the independent variables are the market-to-book ratio (M/B) and cash ﬂow (CF/K).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FC PFC NFC PreGrp1 PreGrp2
CF/K -0.054 0.100 0.099 0.094 -0.033
[19.65]¤¤¤ [22.66]¤¤¤ [26.32]¤¤¤ [29.40]¤¤¤ [15.07]¤¤¤
M/B 0.015 0.045 0.029 0.034 0.018
[9.32]¤¤¤ [16.12]¤¤¤ [14.18]¤¤¤ [19.18]¤¤¤ [13.68]¤¤¤
Constant 0.294 0.265 0.359 0.335 0.317
[44.17]¤¤¤ [45.53]¤¤¤ [54.06]¤¤¤ [62.26]¤¤¤ [71.69]¤¤¤
Number of Observations 27,895 28,085 28,549 38,092 46,437
Number of ﬁrms 8,763 7,656 8,179 9,317 10,619
Adj. R2 2.5% 3.9% 4.6% 4.6% 1.2%
¿2
min 0.9% 5.5% 6.8% 8.1% 1.6%
t-statistics in brackets. ¤¤¤, ¤¤ and ¤: signiﬁcance levels at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Figure 4: Mean (thick line) and median (thin line) I/K for ventiles of WC/K.
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